Huseyin NurluIn 1964, when communal violence erupted in Cyprus, the United Nations moved swiftly to deploy a peacekeeping mission.
The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was hailed as a stabilising force, tasked with preventing a descent into all-out war. Six decades later, the mission still patrols the island.
But what was once seen as a success story now increasingly looks like a liability — not just for Cyprus, but for the UN’s credibility worldwide.
UNFICYP continues to operate under a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed only with the Greek Cypriot Administration. It still ignores the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), even while operating on its territory, from Lefke to Gazimagusa.
Flashpoints such as the Pile road dispute and the fenced-off area of Varosha expose the UN’s unwillingness to treat both communities equally.
The lesson from Cyprus is sobering: when the UN abandons impartiality, it undermines not only trust in one mission but the very legitimacy of peacekeeping as a tool of international order.
This week at the United Nations General Assembly, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan put the issue in perspective when he once again made a fervent call to the world to grant recognition to the TRNC and end the "unjust isolation" of Turkish Cypriots.
Consent and sovereignty: The bedrock of peacekeeping
The UN’s own doctrine rests on three principles: consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence. Without consent, peacekeepers risk being seen not as neutral mediators but as occupiers.
The operations continue in TRNC territory solely by the goodwill of the TRNC authorities. In Cyprus, UNFICYP continues to deploy on TRNC territory without securing its approval. This is not a minor procedural oversight, it is a breach of the UN’s core peacekeeping principles.
The absence of equal stakeholder status or a legal framework for the TRNC creates a perception that peacekeeping enforces the status quo rather than facilitates a fair resolution.
The mission’s reliance on the 1964 SOFA is another glaring weakness.
That agreement was signed with a government which was later overthrown in a Greek junta–backed coup, and it no longer represents the political reality of the island. Since 1974, Cyprus has been divided, yet the UN still clings to a one-sided framework.
Peacekeeping mandates are not meant to freeze history in time; they are supposed to evolve with the facts on the ground.
By refusing to update its mandate, UNFICYP has trapped itself in a framework that privileges one side while alienating the other. This legal inertia is not just outdated, it actively feeds the perception of bias.
Other missions have undergone mandate renewals or renegotiations to account for shifting political realities, for instance, when South Sudan achieved independence in 2011, or when the UN restructured its missions in Timor-Leste after independence.
For Turkish Cypriots, the continuation of the 1964 SOFA without their inclusion confirms the suspicion that the UN is less an impartial arbiter than a guarantor of the unfair status quo.
The longer the UN resists modernising this mandate, the deeper the trust deficit grows, not only on the island but in how other divided societies view the credibility of international peacekeeping.
Flashpoints that reveal bias
The UN’s credibility problem in Cyprus is not theoretical. It plays out in real, tangible disputes that affect daily life.
Take the Pile road dispute. This project was solely for the ease of daily life of the local people and to improve humanitarian access. When Turkish Cypriots sought to build a road connecting the village of Pile to TRNC-controlled territory, the UN intervened to block the project.
For Turkish Cypriots, this was not the act of a neutral arbiter but of a mission determined to obstruct basic infrastructure and privilege the other side’s narrative.
Or look at Varosha, the fenced-off town frozen in time since the 1970s.
In recent years, the Turkish Cypriot authorities have put forward initiatives to gradually reopen Varosha, allowing Greek and Turkish Cypriot owners to submit property claims through the Immovable Property Commission (IPC), a body already recognised by the European Court of Human Rights as a valid mechanism.
Far from being a land grab, this was presented as a practical, fair-minded initiative to unlock a half-century of stalemate. Yet the UN’s hesitation to even engage with these proposals has reinforced the perception of a Greek Cypriot monopoly over legitimacy.
The symbolism is potent: an entire community’s rights and initiatives are left in limbo, not because they lack merit, but because the UN refuses to adapt its outdated framework.
These flashpoints are not isolated. They illustrate how one-sided frameworks warp decisions, turning peacekeepers into obstacles rather than facilitators.
The way forward
The UN’s credibility crisis is not abstract; it is lived on the ground by communities who see blue helmets obstructing their projects or ignoring their consent.
Neutrality cannot exist without equality. When the UN refuses to treat both communities in Cyprus as stakeholders, it delegitimises its mission and undermines trust in the institution as a whole.
If the UN is serious about restoring trust, the path forward is clear:
Recognise the TRNC as a stakeholder: it means acknowledging that no mission can be legitimate without the consent of those who are inhabitants of and control the territory.
Update mandates regularly: Require reviews every decade so missions do not get trapped in outdated frameworks like Cyprus’s 1964 SOFA, but aligned with today’s reality.
Create local consent committees: Establish mechanisms for both sides, or all communities in any given conflict, to voice approval or dissent formally.
Appoint independent neutrality monitors: External oversight can help track bias, build accountability, and ensure that peacekeeping remains true to its principles.
These reforms would not only revive credibility in Cyprus but also strengthen peacekeeping across the globe.
Cyprus is more than a local dispute, it is a test case for the UN’s global credibility. Can the organisation live up to its own ideals of impartiality, fairness, and justice? Or will it remain trapped in outdated frameworks that privilege one side and alienate the other?
A fairer world is indeed possible, but only if the UN embraces reform. If it can adapt in Cyprus, it can prove that peacekeeping still has a future. If it cannot, then the credibility crisis will deepen, on this island and everywhere the blue helmets deploy.
