Kazim AlamThe meeting of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan with US President Donald Trump on September 25 unfolded against a backdrop of strained ties under the previous Biden administration.
The downturn in Türkiye-US relations was marked by disputes over Ankara’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 missile system, Syria policy and US sanctions that restricted the access of some Turkish firms to the US market.
But in a brief exchange with reporters while bidding farewell to Erdogan on September 25, Trump described the encounter as a “great meeting” and lavished praise on Erdogan, calling him “tough” and “highly respected”.
Discussions ranged from defence, trade, and energy deals to the raging conflicts in the Middle East, with the Turkish president later hailing “meaningful progress” on key issues.
Expressing cautious optimism, experts say the high-level meeting in the White House has potentially unlocked long-term defence and economic benefits for Ankara.
“Trump’s public endorsement of Erdogan signals a notable thaw in US-Türkiye relations, marking a significant shift from the Biden administration’s stance,” Yasar Sari, director of Haydar Aliyev Centre for Eurasian Studies at Ibn Haldun University, tells TRT World.
He says both presidents share a dislike for the so-called “liberal international order” while favouring bilateralism over alliance straitjackets. Yet rhetoric alone will not suffice, he cautions.
“As we know Trump’s personality, we need time to see if the rhetoric translates into policy,” he says, adding that the meeting is a “promising step”.
Sari flagged the November congressional elections in the US as a potential pivot, where a more hawkish Congress could possibly rein in Trump’s overtures. Deeper fissures – such as Washington’s support for Israel, its backing of YPG/PYD, and Ankara’s close relations with Moscow – will not go away at once.
“While this personal diplomacy creates a positive atmosphere for short-term gains, its capacity to address deep-rooted disagreements and strengthen the long-term relationship remains uncertain,” Sari says.
The view is echoed by Ahmet Uysal, a professor of political science at Istanbul University. Highlighting the geostrategic lens of Republican administrations in the US, he calls Trump's overture “major” as opposed to the “limited nature” of the Biden administration.
“Generally, the Republican leaders value Türkiye’s geostrategic significance more than the Democrat administrations,” Uysal tells TRT World.
“The personal diplomacy between Trump and Erdogan will produce concrete results as it did during the first Trump era,” he says, while predicting an “energising” of ties under Trump’s “unique foreign policy perspective”.
Reviving defence ties
Few issues symbolise the ups and downs of the Türkiye-US relationship like defence procurement.
Ankara’s 2019 purchase of Russian S-400 systems led to its ouster from the F-35 programme and CAATSA sanctions in 2020, eroding interoperability with NATO allies.
Signs of progress during Erdogan’s US visit can potentially recast Türkiye’s role in the alliance, as it eyes dominance in the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean.
“Progress on the F-16 and F-35 agreements would greatly enhance Türkiye’s defence stance within NATO by addressing key capability gaps until its military complex can produce the desired capacity for the Turkish military,” says Sari.
Regaining F-35 access would not only restore cutting-edge stealth capabilities, but also mend a “major rift” with the US in 2019, he adds.
According to Matthew Bryza, a former US ambassador to Azerbaijan and an Istanbul-based expert on Eurasian affairs, Trump’s hand was “forced” by the US Congress in 2020 to impose the sanctions.
He views the expected lifting of these sanctions as a political balm more than an economic panacea.
“The CAATSA sanctions were seen as a political insult by Türkiye, and rightfully so. Erdogan and the Turkish government will look at (the lifting of sanctions) as a gesture of goodwill,” he tells TRT World.
In such a case, the upsides for Türkiye include US financing for Turkish defence exports and resumed F-35 parts production by local firms.
On the civilian front, Boeing purchases would supercharge Turkish Airlines, already the world’s most far-flung carrier, amplifying Ankara’s soft power at the global stage.
“Turkish Air will become an even stronger element of Türkiye’s diplomacy,” Bryza says.
He says finalising deals for new F-16s, upgrade kits and an F-35 return will “significantly strengthen” Türkiye’s air force.
Yet he downplays immediate ripple effects on regional hotspots, like Syria or Palestine, where Ankara is not poised for direct aerial engagement.
Instead, Bryza points to Türkiye’s stabilising presence in the region as Trump publicly recognises Ankara’s role in toppling Bashar al Assad’s Baathist regime in Damascus last year and subsequently supporting the new Syrian leadership under Ahmed al Sharaa.
Sari says the potential lifting of CAATSA sanctions, coupled with the purchase of 225 Boeing aircraft, will unlock Ankara’s economic resilience and create a ripple effect.
“Removing CAATSA sanctions would immediately eliminate the legal penalties restricting Türkiye’s defence industry,” he says, adding that the move will restore its ability to obtain US export licences that are vital for numerous defence and dual-use technologies.
Ankara as a regional broker
Experts say the Middle East agenda of the Erdogan-Trump meeting solidified Türkiye’s role as a regional mediator.
Discussions on Palestine underscored divergences: Ankara calls Israel’s war in Gaza, which has killed nearly 66,000 people in the last two years, a “genocide”, while Trump has been a supporter of Israeli premier Benjamin Netanyahu.
Yet there are hints of bridge-building. Uysal singles out Gaza as the “most difficult and thorny aspect” of the Türkiye-US relationship, with views “180 degrees” apart on each side.
Still, its inclusion in talks between Trump and world Muslim leaders show there is pressure on the US for reconciliation.
“Probably these meetings put extra pressure on the US as they began to signal that we might see a reconciliation in Gaza soon,” Uysal says.
Bryza also foresees a pivotal niche for Türkiye’s Hamas channel if Israel starts negotiating earnestly.
“I have always believed that Türkiye’s ability to talk to Hamas could play an important role if Israel becomes serious about negotiating an end to the war,” he says.
Citing Erdogan’s past success in securing hostage releases, he says Trump may be eager to enlist the Turkish president’s help.
“Trump clearly admires Erdogan. He would maybe turn to the Turkish president and ask to help bring Hamas along in the negotiations,” he says.
Synergies shine brighter in Syria, where Assad is gone and both sides back Ahmed al Sharaa’s government, he notes.
“Türkiye can play a role, and is playing a crucial role, in Syria... in working with the US to help al Sharaa establish a unified and stable Syria.”
