Mehmet Emre KahramanA recent surge in drone incursions across Eastern Europe has exposed a significant weakness in the continent’s air defence capabilities. This concerning situation has raised serious questions about Europe's ability to respond to a large-scale drone swarm attack.
The most significant event occurred over Poland during the night of September 9–10, when nearly 20 Russian drones reportedly entered its airspace. Polish F-16 fighters, along with allied aircraft, were dispatched to intercept the target. While some drones were successfully intercepted and destroyed, others managed to evade detection.
This vulnerability was seen beyond Poland: Romania monitored a drone in its airspace for almost an hour, Estonia reported several violations, and in Denmark, unidentified drones forced temporary shutdowns at different airports and caused panic in military installations.
The pattern of violations showed that the threat was not isolated but part of a broader challenge to allied airspace security. In response to a security threat, Poland invoked Article 4 of the NATO treaty, which allows a member state to request consultations with other allies. This action has only occurred seven times since NATO was founded in 1949.
These incidents, including airspace violations by jets and drones, are widely seen as a form of ‘hybrid warfare’ aimed at probing vulnerabilities, assessing response times, and projecting intimidation.
Although Russia denies any intent or involvement, European and NATO officials view these actions as a deliberate effort to test the transatlantic alliance's resolve and its support for Ukraine.
Within days, NATO launched Operation Eastern Sentry, deploying fighter jets, naval ships, and surveillance equipment along the eastern border from Finland to Bulgaria.
NATO Secretary-General Rutte emphasised that NATO's Eastern Sentry mission demonstrated the alliance's readiness.
However, the rapid deployment also revealed an unsettling reality: Europe’s current air defence systems are inadequate against such threats.
The defence gap along the eastern front is significant, with NATO estimated to have only about 5 percent of the needed capacity. It is now crucial to prioritise the acquisition of advanced, effective defence systems, especially those designed to counter this new era of hybrid warfare.
Addressing this challenge requires a layered, networked system that integrates modern radar, electronic warfare, and rapid interception technologies to counter a wide and adaptable range of aerial threats.
The sudden urgency behind building a ‘drone wall’ reflects Europe’s need to close a critical gap in its defence.
From aspiration to necessity
The drone incursion forced Poland and its allies to deploy advanced air defence systems against low-cost drones, revealing a fundamental weakness in Europe’s defence structure.
Deploying fighter jets and missiles against low-cost drones is more than a budgetary concern; it points to a broader imbalance in force structure.
Relying on high-end assets for low-end threats strains resources and risks reducing overall readiness and flexibility.
The incident exposes a more fundamental strategic flaw. European defence planning remains based on Cold War assumptions, emphasising large-scale, state-on-state conflicts, whereas adversaries are increasingly employing persistent, low-cost drone tactics to gradually deplete resources.
If European defences do not adapt, adversaries can systematically impose disproportionate financial and operational burdens, slowly weakening both deterrence and the ability to respond to more advanced threats.
This imbalance has revived momentum behind the ‘drone wall’ concept, initially proposed by Lithuania in 2023. Once dismissed as aspirational, it is now treated as a strategic necessity.
Following the Poland drone incursion, European Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius called for the urgent development of drone defence along the EU’s entire eastern flank, signalling a shift from ad hoc national measures toward coordinated regional defence.
The drone wall signifies a strategic shift rather than just a single technological solution.
It employs a layered defence system that includes inexpensive electronic warfare (jamming, spoofing), detection networks, interceptor drones, mobile guns, and missile systems.
Each layer targets threats at different points, providing a graduated response that uses costly systems only for high-value targets.
This layered approach serves two core functions. First, it boosts cost efficiency by matching defensive responses to the economic scale of the threat, reducing the attritional advantage that drones currently provide to adversaries.
Second, it enhances operational resilience by spreading defensive capacity across multiple layers, decreasing single-point vulnerabilities. By shifting from reactive, high-cost interception to proactive, scalable defence, the drone wall provides a practical way to restore balance in Europe’s air defence posture.
Collaboration for resilience
European officials are increasingly viewing this shift as essential for preserving their strategic credibility and geopolitical influence.
Since no single European nation has all the necessary capabilities to effectively counter changing aerial threats, a collaborative approach becomes both strategically crucial and economically sensible.
A fragmented national approach is no longer sustainable. The speed of innovation in drone and anti-drone technologies is fast and uneven, benefiting actors that can adapt and scale rapidly.
Joint development and deployment share financial burdens, improve interoperability among national systems, and enable coordinated adaptation to new tactics and strategies.
Combining industrial and technological resources also reduces duplication, speeds up innovation cycles, and creates a coherent defence ecosystem capable of matching the agility of drone technology.
For European policymakers, partnering with Ukraine is essential for the ‘drone wall’ initiative. Ukraine’s operational experience provides vital tactical insights for developing the drone defence system.
However, concentrating knowledge and technological inputs in one partner risks creating structural vulnerabilities, including overreliance and limited diversification of expertise.
Involving Türkiye in discussions around the initiative could help lower these risks and reinforce the broader framework.
Türkiye’s defence industry has shown significant capacity to develop flexible and cost-effective systems at scale. Engaging with Türkiye would add an industrial dimension, diversify technological inputs, and enhance the initiative’s resilience to future strategic challenges.
The race for anti-drone technology
The rapid spread of affordable, adaptable drones across Eastern Europe signals a new phase in modern warfare.
The widespread availability of these drones has altered the way conflicts are fought, enabling adversaries to achieve strategic goals at a significantly reduced cost.
Anti-drone capabilities are becoming essential components of national security, comparable to missile defence and cybersecurity. Since the ‘drone wall’ project is a long-term effort, incorporating this adaptable approach from the outset will be crucial to its success and longevity.
As drones become faster, more autonomous, and more resistant to interference, countermeasures must evolve in parallel. This is not a one-time technological adjustment but a continuous, iterative competition in which each offensive innovation generates new defensive requirements.
Anti-drone strategies initially used RF jamming, which caused drones to switch to fibre-optic control and pre-programmed routes.
Then, defenders adopted GPS spoofing, leading drones to rely on AI-driven autonomy and multi-sensor navigation. This evolution illustrates an ongoing offence-defence cycle, with each innovation prompting the subsequent development.
Modern anti-drone systems rely on three interconnected functions: detection, disruption, and destruction.
Early warning tools such as radars, acoustic sensors, and RF trackers spot incoming threats. Electronic warfare then seeks to neutralise control links through jamming or spoofing.
Lastly, kinetic systems, like interceptor drones, mobile guns, or missiles, target remaining threats.
No single element provides a complete solution; success depends on integrating these layers into a unified and adaptable defence network.
Directed-energy weapons, especially high-energy lasers, could revolutionise anti-drone systems.
They offer unlimited ammunition, minimal per-shot costs, and rapid engagement capabilities. By neutralising the cost advantage of cheap drones over expensive interceptors, they have the potential to rebalance the offence-defence equation.
Without embracing these advanced anti-drone systems, Europe risks fighting future battles with outdated tools and facing disastrous consequences.
